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Royal Decree-Law 22/2018 equipped the Banco de 
España with a broad range of macroprudential tools, 
including borrower-based measures. These instruments, 
which will be applicable to, inter alia, the mortgage 
portfolio, will focus on limiting the debt service burden of 
mortgage payments for borrowers, or on reducing the level 
of leverage with respect to the available collateral. They 
will thus contribute to improving borrower solvency, since 
experience has shown that when loan terms ease and 
leverage increases or a greater debt service burden falls 
on borrowers, the risk of default usually increases.
This box summarises the results of a study analysing the 
effect of credit standards (and of their interactions) on 
the level of mortgage credit risk.1 The exercise takes the 
terms and conditions of loans at their origination date and 
applies a battery of econometric models to estimate 
the probability of mortgage foreclosure proceedings or, 
alternatively, of a loan becoming non-performing. This 
analysis starts out by defining the indicators which other 
studies have found to be important2 for determining 
default risk. Thus, to measure leverage, two ratios were 
calculated which compare the loan amount with the 
house value: the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, the 
denominator of which is the house appraisal value, and 
the loan-to-price (LTP) ratio, the denominator of which 
is the registered price of the house purchase transaction. 
The financial burden of borrowers is proxied by the 
loan service-to-income (LSTI) ratio, which is the 
proportion of a borrower’s annual income used for loan 
repayments at the origination date. Lastly, other 
characteristics of mortgages are examined, such as 
maturity, house type and location, borrower charac-
teristics including employment status, and loan purpose.
Data from the Association of Registrars were used to 
develop a model to calculate the probability of mortgage 
foreclosure proceedings. Chart 1 shows that this probability 
tends to increase with increasing LTV and LTP ratios. 
However, the LTV ratio does not seem to show an effective 
association with higher risk for values above 80%. This is 
not so with the LTP ratio, for which risk grows more 
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1  See Galán, J.E. and M. Lamas (2019). Beyond the LTV ratio: new macroprudential lessons from Spain. Working Paper 1931. Banco 
de España.
2  Us was made of two databases which contain a sample of loans and include the individual information on characteristics of 
mortgages	at	origination.	First,	we	took	information	from	the	Association	of	Registrars,	which	identifies	all	mortgages	taken	out	in	
Spain since before the crisis Second, we supplemented this information by that from a repository of securitisation data, namely the 
European DataWarehouse. In both cases, the information refers to house mortgages granted to individuals.
SOURCES: Spanish Association of Registrars (Colegio de Registradores) and European DataWarehouse.
a The probability of occurrence of the stress event (mortgage foreclosure or non-performance) is estimated for loans which in theory have the same 
characteristics and which only change in the value of their LTV, LTP, maturity or LSTI, depending on the chart. Except in the case where the LTV 
ratio is above 80%, the confidence intervals of these estimates are small, so the changes in probability are statistically significant.
b The LTP ratio is plotted on the horizontal axis.
c The index expresses the risk of new mortgage lending having regard to the volume of credit granted and to credit standards. The NPL ratio is that 
of loans for house purchase and renovation. The last year of this sample is 2017.
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ratio is above 80%, the confidence intervals of these estimates are small, so the changes in probability are statistically significant.
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markedly over the whole distribution. In this connection, 
the LTP ratio seems to be better at distinguishing the risk 
of mortgage transactions. This suggests that house values 
estimated through appraisals should be supplemented 
by the effective transaction value.
Additionally, other models were estimated using a 
database containing information on securitised loans and 
on borrowers’ main characteristics, including their income 
(European DataWarehouse). The results demonstrate the 
importance of taking into account the interactions between 
different measures of credit standards to explain the 
behaviour of troubled loans. In particular, Chart 2 shows 
the impact on the probability that loans will become non-
performing for different LSTI ratios and for two LTV ratios 
(70% and 90%). It can be seen that not only does risk 
increase as the borrower debt service burden rises, but 
also that the more highly leveraged loans (i.e. higher LTV 
ratio) are associated with a higher level of risk (and that it 
also rises more sharply). The probability of becoming non-
performing in Chart 2 is higher than the probability of 
mortgage foreclosure in Chart 1, since the stress event 
considered is different.3
Chart 3, in which once again information from the database 
of the Association of Registrars is used, plots the changes 
in the probability of mortgage foreclosure as a function of 
the LTP ratio for two mortgage maturities (20 and 30 years). 
It can be seen that maturity starts to become an additional 
determinant of risk for high leverage values. From the 
standpoint of use of regulatory instruments, these results 
indicate that the simultaneous activation of limits on 
various credit standards would be more effective than the 
implementation of just one of them.
Lastly, the quantitative results of the study allow the 
construction of indicators to monitor the mortgage risk 
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SOURCES: Spanish Association of Registrars (Colegio de Registradores) and European DataWarehouse.
a The probability of occurrence of the stress event (mortgage foreclosure or non-performance) is estimated for loans which in theory have the same 
characteristics and which only change in the value of their LTV, LTP, maturity or LSTI, depending on the chart. Except in the case where the LTV 
ratio is above 80%, the confidence intervals of these estimates are small, so the changes in probability are statistically significant.
b The LTP ratio is plotted on the horizontal axis.
c The index expresses the risk of new mortgage lending having regard to the volume of credit granted and to credit standards. The NPL ratio is that 
of loans for house purchase and renovation. The last year of this sample is 2017.
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3	 	In	the	securitised	loan	database	(European	DataWarehouse),	all	inflows	into	NPLs	form	part	of	the	sample	of	troubled	loans.	In	the	
Association of Registrars, the sample of troubled loans is constructed from the mortgages subject to foreclosure proceedings. This, 
along with the differing coverage of troubled loans in the two databases, explains the higher probability of the stress event in the 
securitised loan database.
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related to the credit standards at the mortgage origination 
date. Thus Chart 4 depicts the behaviour of a mortgage-
loan-at-risk index, reflecting the variation over time of 
future troubled loans, given the credit standards at the 
origination date and the amount of credit granted each 
year.4 In general, the expected value of loans at risk was 
observed to increase significantly before the crisis, 
basically due to the worsening credit standards. These 
results contrast with the behaviour of the NPL rate of this 
portfolio, which remained low until the crisis, at which time 
it began to climb rapidly. The decrease in the risk indicator 
after the outbreak of the crisis seemed to be due to the 
sharp contraction in new mortgages and to the tightening 
of credit standards. These results suggest that the 
estimated index may be useful as a leading indicator of 
vulnerability in the mortgage market.
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4  To construct the mortgage-loan-at-risk index, the probability of default estimated by the model for the loans originated each year is 
multiplied by the total value of the mortgages granted in that year. It is thus a measure of the expected value of the mortgages 
originated in a given year which would be at risk of future default given the credit standards at the origination date. An increase 
(decrease)	in	this	index	may	reflect	an	increase	(decrease)	in	the	probability	of	default	in	the	year	the	loan	was	granted	(which	in	turn	
depends on the credit standards, including the LTV, LTP and LSI ratios), an increase (decrease) in the value of the mortgages granted 
that year, or an increase (decrease) in both. During the years of the sample assessed, on average 75% of the changes in the index 
were attributable to changes in the probability of default and 25% of them to changes in the value of the mortgages granted.
